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LOW-INCOME HOUSING UNDER THE NEW
CONSERVATISM: TRICKLE DOWN OR DRY UP?

I.

INTRODUCTION

The goal of providing a "decent home and suitable living environment for every American" has become an uncertain prospect at
best. Although our society does not constitutionally protect the right
to decent housing, Congress first expressed that the provision of adequate housing was of primary importance in the Housing Act of
1949." In the past few years, the federal government has tried to
limit its role in providing adequate housing.' As a result, tax incentives have become an important factor responsible for increasing the
role of the private sector in housing projects. Private investors interested in investment tax credit4 and accelerated depreciation5 enter
into limited partnerships to finance the construction and rehabilitation of low-income housing. The participation of "charitable" ' or©

1986 by Daryl S. Alterwitz
I. Housing Act of 1949, 42 U.S.C. § 1441 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
2. Id.; see also Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972). "The constitution does not
provide judicial remedies for every social and economic ill. We are unable to perceive in that
document any constitutional guarantee of access to dwelling of a particular quality." Id.
3. See infra notes 13-19 and accompanying text.
4. An investment tax credit [hereinafter cited as ITC] is a fixed amount of money which
is credited against a taxpayer's individual federal tax obligation. These credits are available
only for special qualified types of property. I.R.C. §§ 38, 48 (1982). For a further discussion
of the various tax incentives available, see infra note 23.
5. Depreciation is a device to spread the cost of acquiring property over the period of
time the property is to be used. Each depreciation deduction offsets an equal amount of ordinary income. I.R.C. § 167. Accelerated depreciation allows one to spread the cost of property
over a shorter period of time; thus, larger amounts of ordinary income can be sheltered earlier.
I.R.C. § 168. For a further discussion, see infra notes 6, 23, 93-96 and accompanying text.
6. This type of limited partnership is the basic structure of most investment tax shelters.
Investing limited partners can both shelter their individual incomes by their proportionate
share of partnership depreciation deductions, and they may limit their liability to the extent of
their investment. To the extent a limited partner takes depreciation deductions, his tax obligation is deferred, not forgiven. For a further discussion, see infra notes 23, 36-49, 93-96 and
accompanying text.
7. Throughout this comment the word "charitable" will be used to convey a specific and
limited meaning. A "charitable organization" or "tax exempt charity" refers to an organization committed to the accomplishment of a specific social purpose as set out in I.R.C. §
501 (c)(3). See infra notes 52-57 and accompanying text. A "charitable class" means those who
will benefit by the activities of the charitable organization. In this context, charitable does not
refer to the qualities of munificence or altruism.
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ganizations in combination with private sector investments has created, and may continue to create, unique opportunities to develop
and preserve low-income housing. By entering into limited partnership agreements, tax exempt charities may promote the construction
and rehabilitation of additional housing units for handicapped, elderly and low-income persons; furthermore, they can ensure that
those units will remain available to the charitable class. The participation of charitable organizations, however, has been threatened by
certain provisions of the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984.'
Despite the great potential offered by this unique limited partnership vehicle for raising capital to provide decent, affordable and
long term low-income housing, provisions of the 1984 Act have cast
doubt upon the future of tax exempt organizations in real estate syndications. Those provisions of the Act regulating tax exempt entity
leasing9 have a broad and restrictive effect which severely limits
projects involving tax exempt entities from reaping the benefits of
accelerated depreciation and investment tax credit. Such a disincentive will have a chilling effect upon the participation of charitable
organizations in real estate syndications. In order to effectively involve the private sector in promoting the availability and stability of
low-income housing, certain changes must be made to the 1984 Act
and further explanations of the 1984 Act must be set forth.
Section II of this comment examines the changing roles of the
federal government and the private sector, and Section III analyzes
the benefits and limitations associated with the introduction of charitable organizations into private sector investments. In Section IV
some of the problems and uncertainties created by the 1984 Act Will
be addressed, and Section V suggests changes which will facilitate
the effective involvement of charitable organizations with the private
sector to meet the nation's housing needs.
II.

THE CHANGING ROLES OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
AND THE PRIVATE SECTOR

Since the early 1970s, severe economic problems have developed
at an alarming rate which have brought into serious question the
ability of our economic system to house its people. The double digit
8. Deficit Reduction Act, PuB. L. No. 96-369 (1984). This comment deals only with
division A of the Deficit Reduction Act which is called the Tax Reform Act of 1984 [hereinafter cited as the Act]. The relevant portions of the Act are codified in I.R.C. § 168(0) and §
7701(e). See infra text accompanying notes 91-147.
9. See infra notes 91-109 and accompanying text.
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inflation of the 1970s caused the cost of building new housing to
skyrocket, and the increased investment and speculation in used
housing has made older shelters equally unaffordable to low and medium-income families.10 Furthermore, mortgage interest rates which
have significantly increased since the late 1950s,11 have put additional pressure on the supply of available housing. The enormous
federal deficit and the heavy federal borrowing needed to refinance
that deficit, "is certain to keep pressure on interest rates and the
home buying market.

' 12

These same problems which have plagued the private housing
industry are now afflicting the ability of the federal government to
provide public housing. In 1981, Congress attempted io reduce the
federal deficit by cutting federal spending for housing by nearly fifty
percent. 8 Furthermore, the emphasis of the federal housing programs was shifted from production of new housing to consumption of
existing housing in order to reflect an emerging "New Federalism." 4 Even though President Reagan and his Commission on
Housing have affirmed, in the strongest terms, the national commitment to a continuing role for the federal government in providing
decent housing, 5 a new and less prominent role for the federal gov10. Hartman, Shelter and Community, Soc'y, March-April 1984, at 18. See also
Weicher, Inflationary Ravages, Soc'v, March-April 1984, at 66.
11. Hartman, supra note 10, at 18. See also Muth, Is More Really Better?, Soc'v,
March-April 1984, at 36, 38.
12. Greenwald, The Search For Shelter, TIME, April 30, 1984, at 50, 51.
13. Housing And Community Development Amendments of 1981, PuB. L. No. 97-35,
95 Stat. 384 (1981). See also Nolan, Reexamining FederalHousing Programs In A Time Of
Fiscal Austerity: The Trend Toward Block GrantsAnd Housing Allowances, 14 URB. LAW.
249, 281 (1982). "The decision to reduce federal spending for housing in the current fiscal
year, by nearly 50%, was part of the general reaction to double digit inflation, precipitated in
significant part by federal borrowing to finance the budget deficit." Id. at 281.
14. Comment, Federal Budget Cuts in Housing: Is There No Place Like A Decent
Home?, 10 J. LEGIS. 457, 465-66 (1983). The author traces the evolution of "supply side
federal housing programs" and the shift in focus to a more consumer oriented approach during
the Nixon Administration. This new approach "favored diminishing federal responsibility for
public housing by directly subsidizing housing demand, rather than continuing to pour federal
grant dollars into the supply side of the market by funding construction firms and landlords
[because] . . . federal housing money would never reach those who needed it most-the lowest
of low-income families." Id.
15.

W.

McKENNA, THE REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S

COMM'N ON HOUSING xxii

(1982). President Reagan established a 30-person commission to investigate the housing needs
of Americans and to recommend to him and to the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) options for the development of a national housing policy. Id. at xv. It is interesting to note that the commission was stacked with representatives of the banking, real estate
and construction business world; 29 of the commission's 30 members were republicans, 25
were white males, and there were no representatives of the construction trades or housing/
consumer rights organizations. Hartman, supra note 10, at 23.
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ernment is inevitable.16 The Housing Commission Report proposed
that a "consumer oriented Housing Payments Program" become the
major housing program for low-income households. 17 Those programs would be carried out in a way to reduce federal control and
regulation and increase state and local control and accountability.'
Recognizing the inability of federal housing payments to effectively address the problems of housing adequacy and supply, the
Commission proposed the addition of a Housing Component to the
Community Development Block Grant Program. This program
would provide funds for.new construction and rehabilitation which
would be allocated to and administered by local, regional and state
agencies. 9 This combination of budget cuts and the reduced role of
the federal government in providing low-cost housing has led housing specialists to consider the prospect of additional low-cost housing
as "bleak." 2
Another essential component of the "New Federalism," beyond
reducing the federal regulatory and financial involvement in low-income housing and delegating the fiscal and administrative responsibilities to local and state authorities, relies on the involvement of the
private sector. 2 The Housing Commission Report noted that, in addition to new construction, some of the necessary rental stock must
16. W.

MCKENNA,

supra note 15 at 3-4. Others have described the harsh realities of

the 1980s as follows: "In short, don't expect any more public bailouts from Uncle Sam. The
federal government has sent the message loud and clear: find new and creative solutions to
your problems, involve the private sector, be more efficient and businesslike but, whatever you
do, don't call us." Howell, Project Syndication: How It Works, 41 J. HOUSING 107 (1984).
17. W. MCKENNA, supra note 15, at 35. See also Schecter, Closing The Gap Between
Need And Provision, Soc'Y, March-April 1984, at 40, in which the author points out that the
Reagan housing policy marks a retreat from past policies of meeting the housing needs of lowincome people through government-assisted housing production programs. Instead of meeting
those needs through targeted supply increases, the new policy would issue partial-rent-payments vouchers. Such a policy "could create added demands in rental markets which are bound
to remain in short supply for several years, following the depressed production years of 198082." Id. at 42.
18. W. MCKENNA, supra note 15, at 35. See also Clay & Frieden, A Plea For Less
Regulation, Soc'v, March-April 1984, at 48; Williamson, Community Development Block
Grants, 14 URB. LAW. 283 (1982).
19. W. McKENNA, supra note 15, at 18, 27-29.
20. See Kabaker, Outlook For Low Cost Housing Called Bleak, NATION'S CITIES
WEEKLY, March 15, 1982, at 2. See also Nenno, Housing Allowances Are Not Enough,
Soc'v, at 54. Arguing that federal assistance is required to improve the supply and condition
of housing, the author contends that there is an urgent need to reestablish new construction
and major rehabilitation as a housing assistance mechanism. Id. at 54. More recent reports
support her position as low-income housing resources are unable to keep up with demand and
cities are unable to meet the needs of the homeless. [Current Developments], Hous. & DEV.
REP. (BNA) 50, 56 (June 18, 1984).
21. W. MCKENNA, supra note 15, at 76-86.
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come from the conversion of commercial and industrial buildings to
residential use, and from the transformation of existing houses and
large apartments to provide more rental units." At first glance, the
1981 Economic Recovery Tax Act (ERTA), the 1984 Act, and other
provisions of the Internal Revenue Code seem to provide incentives
for the private sector to construct and rehabilitate low-cost public
housing.2" Despite outward appearances, however, expert real estate
syndicators in the field of low-income housing predict that the incentive of accelerated depreciation is insufficient, in the absence of a
sensible financing mechanism, to spur the creation of new housing.
With supply down and demand up, the accelerated depreciation incentive "will simply make housing more valuable.""' '
The recent tax acts fail to provide adequate incentives to stimulate private sector involvement in increasing the supply of low-cost
housing. One foreseeable consequence of this failure is that a new
business will emerge in lieu of the creation of new housing-the
resyndication of existing subsidized housing.2 The net effect of this
22. Id. at xxviii.
23. ERTA created the Accelerated Cost Recovery System [hereinafter cited as ACRS]
(I.R.C. § 168) which fixed the recovery period for depreciation of both new and used residential property at 15 years and provided for a 200% declining balance method of depreciation for
low-income housing. I.R.C. § 168 (b)(2)(A)(ii) (CCH-1984). PUB. L. No. 99-121, § 103, 98
Stat. 631, 1985-48 I.R.B. 11, increased the recovery period for real property placed in service
after May 8, 1985 to 19 years. The tax reform bill proposed by the House of Representatives
would repeal the ACRS system and replace it with the Incentive Depreciation System which
would generally lengthen the recovery period for real property to 28 years. H.R. No. 3838,
99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 201, 175 CONG. REC. 12,589 (1985). For the effect of the proposed
reform on low-income housing, see infra notes 166-67.
The 1984 Act increased the recovery period to 18 years for all residential properties except low-income housing. I.R.C. § 168 (b)(2), (4) (CCH-1984). The 1984 Act also extended
the application of I.R.C. § 167(k) (CCH-1984), which allows a 60-month recovery period for
the depreciation of expenditures of up to $40,000 for the rehabilitation of low-income rental
housing. In addition, certain investment tax credits may be available for the qualified rehabilitation of low-income housing. I.R.C. §§ 38, 48 (a)(1)(E), and (g)(2)(D) (CCH-1984). These
incentives allow taxpayers, especially those in the highest tax bracket, to shelter their present
incomes from further taxation. Tax credits will directly offset a portion of the tax imposed by
the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). Depreciation gives rise to deductions against one's taxable
income which effectively defers the payment of certain taxes and reduces the amount of taxable
income by converting ordinary income into capital gains. The capital gains may be recaptured
and converted into ordinary income upon disposition of the property pursuant to I.R.C. §
1250.
24. D. SMITH, SUBSIDIZED HOUSING AS A TAX SHELTER 4-6 (1982). Smith believes
"the shortage is approaching crisis proportions." Id.
25. Id. at 7. The author argues:
The 1981 Tax Act has made existing owners of subsidized syndications
more willing to sell, and potential investors much more willing to buy. As new
construction financing evaporates, the availability of new construction housing
as a tax shelter should continue to dwindle. Consequently, high-bracketed inves-
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type of private sector involvement will be to reduce the amount of
available low-cost shelter. Because tax sheltering is the primary investment motive in subsidized housing, 6 overpayment for a subsidized housing syndication would allow limited partners in the investment partnership to take greater depreciation deductions and,
therefore, to shelter more income.2 7 To justify these hyped-up valuations and the inflated debt required to finance such a purchase, 8 a
new "reversion/shelter" approach to valuation has emerged. 9 This
new valuation method requires an appraiser to determine the minimum holding period contractually permitted, after which the property will no longer be operated as government-regulated low-income
housing. The property may then be, typically, converted into condominiums, cooperatives or other more profitable forms of rental property in order to pay off the inflated debt."0
Due to the earlier influx of tax-sheltered investment dollars into
the construction of new housing, and the rehabilitation of old dwellings, investors have been willing to speculate upon the gentrification
of old neighborhoods. This upgrading of old, run down, low-income
tors
will begin exploring other forms of real estate tax shelters. Resyndications
of existing subsidized housing will be an excellent vehicle.
Id. See also The New Allure of Subsidized Housing, NATION'S Bus., Nov. 1983, at 20.
26. See supra notes 5, 6, and 23.
27. Because every yearly depreciation deduction is a fixed proportion of the cost of the
property, a high original cost will yield high deductions and shelter more income.
28. Where nonrecourse financing is an element of the purchase price, inflated
value becomes a risk and arm's-length negotiation provides no protection. Consequently, tax courts and the IRS have generally required an independent verification that the purchase price does not exceed market value, testimony of expert appraisers or a written appraisal carries great weight.
Kirk & Smith, Using The ReversionIShelter Approach to Appraise Subsidized Housing, APPRAISAL. J., July 1983, at 327.
29. Id. at 326, 333-36. Under such an approach, the value of the subsidized housing
units is adjusted upward to reflect the value of the expected net operating income, the tax
benefits available during the holding period, and the residual value of the expected reversion.
To measure the reversion, an appraiser determines the minimum holding period contractually
permitted, after which the property will no longer be operated as government-regulated lowincome housing. Id. For a further discussion of the residual value of a low-income real estate
syndication, see infra note 46 and accompanying text.
30. D. SMITH, supra note 24, at 73-82. See also Horowitz, Condominium Conversion
Controls, Soc'Y, March-April 1984, at 58. The author cites the accelerating incidence of
rental to condominium conversion as a cause of involuntary displacement of low and moderateincome families through the erosion of the supply of rental housing. Even though conversions
make available more opportunities for home ownership, a "policy of laissez-faire is unacceptable. It represents the implicit assumption that landlords-but not tenants-are entitled to
legal protection." Id. at 60. For a discussion of some of the problems created by the conversion
of rental property, see U.S. DEP'T OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, CONVERSION
OF RENTAL HOUSING TO CONDOMINIUMS
VERSION REGULATIONS

47-59 (1981).

AND COOPERATIVES: STATE AND LOCAL CON-
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housing has typically attracted young urban professionals into older
neighborhoods and has displaced the less fortunate tenants of the
previously low-income communities. 1 Thus, many successful syndications of low-cost housing are predicated on the expected conversion
of the low-cost housing units into more profitable investments which
will displace low-income tenants, reduce the already short supply of
low-income housing, and further exacerbate the crisis of low-cost
32
shelter.
III.

THE INTRODUCTION OF CHARITIES INTO INVESTMENT

PARTNERSHIPS

A.

Opportunities

Despite the increasing number of factors which push the goal of
decent and affordable housing further from realization, a number of
positive steps may be and have been taken toward achieving that
goal. 8 The greatest potential may arise from tax-exempt organiza31. Hartman, supra note 10, at 19. The author notes that the displacement of residents
from their homes and communities is occurring at disturbingly high rates and for various
reasons, including gentrification. Id. See also Urban Revival: A Dream Yet To Come True,
U.S. NEws & WORLD REp., Feb. 20, 1984, at 51. "Yet along with this facelift of sagging
neighborhoods-spurred by young professionals who seek housing bargains and tax shelters-have come rising rents and taxes that drive out low-income residents and many mom and
pop businesses." Id.
32. Wingo & Wolch, Urban Land Policy Under The New Conservatism, 5 URB. L. &
Poicy 315, 327 (1982). It is uncertain what percentage of displacement is due to gentrification and what percentage of tax sheltered low-income housing projects are converted into condominiums and other higher profit forms of property. What is certain is that the reversion
potential in tax sheltered housing arrangements will not be left unexploited by "benevolent"
developers and investors. Instead, as others have suggested, the federal government "could
make rehabilitation and development incentives available only-or on more attractive
terms-to those who produce housing that is permanently placed outside the speculative sector." Hartman, supra note 10, at 25. For a discussion of the relationship between conversions
and rental supply, see Horowitz, supra note 30, at 64.
33. For example: 1) At the federal level, I.R.C. § 167(k), which provides a 60-month
recovery period for $20,000 of qualified rehabilitation of low-income housing, was supplemented by ERTA, and an additional $20,000 of rehabilitation expenditures became available
if "the program provides for sale of the units to tenants demonstrating home ownership responsibility" at a fixed reduced price. I.R.C. § 167(k)(2)(B) (CCH 1984); 2) At the state and
local levels, the City of San Francisco responded to its housing shortage with a plan requiring
office developers to build, rehabilitate, sponsor or finance housing in order to receive permission to build. See Diamond, The San Francisco Office/Housing Program: Social Policy Underwritten By Private Enterprise,7 HARV. ENVT'L. L. REV. 449 (1983). For a discussion of
local ordinances regulating eviction from and condominium conversion of housing subject to
rent control, see Comment, Flynn v. City of Cambridge: Guideposts For The Control Of Condominium Conversions, 33 MERCER L. REV. 949 (1982); 3) In the private sector, there are
national organizations committed to the provision and maintenance of decent, affordable housing for those of low and moderate incomes. The National Housing Law Project and the Na-
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tions which enter into investment partnerships with the private sector to finance charitable activities."' The participation of charities in
low-cost housing syndications offers a tremendous vehicle for effective involvement of the private sector in meeting the nation's housing
needs. As a general partner, a tax exempt charity may join with
profit motivated investors in a limited partnership to raise capital.
The charitable general partner can then ensure that the funds and
services it contributes are properly used to accomplish charitable
objectives. 5
The basic structure underlying all project syndications is the
limited partnership." The primary incentive for using a limited
partnership as an investment vehicle is two-fold: 1) the partnership
can pass through any losses and other tax deductions37 generated by
the partnership, to offset the limited partner's income from other
sources;38 and 2) still limit the liability of the limited partners to
their original investment.89 For a tax exempt charity, the limited
partnership offers an excellent vehicle to raise capital and realize its
charitable goals.' 0 In addition to being an important source of capital, a limited partnership can be a particularly appropriate vehicle
for conducting charitable activities because the tax exempt entity, as
general partner, will have control over the invested funds and can
insure that those funds will be used for charitable purposes."'
tional Leased Housing Association has offices in Berkeley, Cal. and Washington, D.C. See
also Group Fights Displacement of Poor, NAT'L. CATH. REP., Feb. 20, 1981, at 2.
34. See, e.g., Pierce, Restored Housing For The Poor-Without Displacement, NATION'S
CITIES WEEKLY, Feb. 20, 1984, at 8. See also Purcell & Yanowitz, Using The Investment
Partnership As A Charitable Activity, 60 J. TAX'N, at 214 (1984); Comment, Participation
Of Charities In Limited Partnerships,93 YALE L.J. 1355 (1984).
35. Purcell & Yanowitz, supra note 34.
36. Howell, supra note 16; see also, supra note 6.
37. These losses and tax deductions include depreciation deductions under I.R.C. §§
167, 168 (see supra notes 5 and 23) and amortization of organization fees under I.R.C. § 709.
38. See generally Aslanides, Cardinali, Haynsworth, Lane & Niesan, Limited Partnerships - What's Next And What's Left?, 34 Bts. LAW. 257 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Asianides]. For an overview of the partnership taxation issues, see infra note 106 and accompanying text. For a basic definition of a tax shelter, see supra note 6 and accompanying text.
39. See Aslanides, supra note 38; see also UNtF. LIMITED PARTNERSHIP ACT § 7
(1916).
40. Comment, supra note 34, at 1358.
41. Id. at 1360. Because control does not necessarily follow ownership in the property,
the general partner may retain exclusive management and control while possessing only an
insignificant financial interest, by drafting an appropriate partnership agreement. Aslanides,
supra note 38, at 259-62. In addition, for the charitable organization to act as general partner
in a for-profit syndication, the organization must comply with the restrictions set forth in
I.R.C. § 501(c) and the regulations thereunder. See infra notes 50-77 and accompanying text.
This will further promote the charitable applications of the capital raised by the syndication.
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More specifically, in the context of low-income housing, the
charitable ends sought are primarily the creation and preservation of
affordable and decent shelter. Various strategies might facilitate this
end,4 but the best method to assure long-term affordability would be
to structure the partnership so that the property is eventually returned to the ownership and control of the nonprofit organization. 43
In order to make possible such a transfer, the tax exempt charitable
organization must have acquired a significant equity interest in the
partnership. Because a charitable organization often has little capital
to invest and its investment potential is limited, 4 its significant economic interest is acquired through a "rear-end allocation" 4 of the
partnership interest in the residual value of the property. 4" An example, which will serve as a model throughout this comment, will
47
best illustrate the principles involved:
42. It is important to point out that the construction and development of low-income
housing is not dependent on the participation of charitable organizations. In fact, most lowincome housing has been constructed by for-profit developers and investors working through
various Housing and Urban Development (HUD) programs. Although the restrictions imposed by HUD require such units to be affordable to low and moderate income families, the
long term affordability of these housing units can be extended beyond those limits by imposition of rent and use restrictions on future sales. These techniques may be utilized independent
of or in conjunction with a charitable nonprofit entity. For example, if one owned the underlying land, he could enter into a ground lease with the real estate syndication and include in that
lease covenants restricting the use of the subsequent development of the property. This technique would not require a tax exempt charity to participate in the syndication. Nolan, Smith
& Power, Syndicating Low- and Moderate-Income Housing, at 47-53 (unpublished manuscript, Nat'l Housing Law Project, 1950 Addison St., Berkeley, Cal. 94704).
43. The property is returned to the nonprofit entity from the partnership by a subsequent sale or other transfer after a period of time. This time period is generally a tax shelter
"burns out," i.e., when the depreciation rate is so reduced that the project will no longer
shelter a substantial amount of the investor's personal income. Id.
44. See infra note 67.
45. The partnership agreement will provide that upon sale or refinancing of the property or termination of the partnership, the tax exempt entity becomes entitled to a substantial
percentage of the proceeds, i.e., the equity or appreciation gain which would otherwise benefit
the for-profit partners. For a more detailed treatment of partnership allocations, see infra note
106 and accompanying text. It is important to note that increased equity participation may
also be achieved by special allocations of partnership interests during the course of the partnership. See infra note 106.
46. The residual value of the property reflects its appreciation in value and the increased equity in the property resulting from appreciation and/or service of the debt taken out
to finance the project. Also reflected in the residual value is the reversion potential resulting
from termination of use restrictions. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
47. This model is very narrowly tailored to demonstrate the basic role of a tax-exempt
entity in a real estate syndication and the effect of the tax-exempt entity leasing provisions of
the 1984 Act on the participation of charitable entities in such real estate syndications. For a
more thorough model including the broad range of finance, rehabilitation expense and other
relevant tax issues, see Power, The Impact Of The Tax Reform Act of 1984 On Syndication
For Low-Income Housing Owned By Non-Profits, HOUSING L. BULL., Sept./Oct. 1984, at 11.

470
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E is a tax exempt nonprofit organization which owns and/or
operates H, a low-income housing project. To raise capital to
improve or build additional housing, E sells H to LP, a limited
partnership set up to operate H as low-income housing. E, acting alone or with a for-profit partner, is the managing General
Partner. E is allocated a minimal percentage (one percent for
example) of partnership items of operating income and loss, and
the remaining percentage is allocated to the limited partnership.
Upon sale of H and/or dissolution of LP, a substantial percentage of the residual liquidating proceeds are allocated to E. 8
This increased equity interest resulting from the rear-end allocation
of residual partnership interests puts the charitable organization in a
position to buy back or determine the future disposition of the housing project.' 9 In those syndications in which the tax exempt partner
is entitled to the residual proceeds or some equity potential, the partnership arrangements should satisfy the limitations under section
501(c) and promote the preservation of long-term low-income
housing.
B.

Limitations Imposed Upon Tax Exempt Organizations

Despite the many potential benefits which a tax exempt general
partner might add to a low-income real estate syndication, the Internal Revenue Service has often rejected the participation of such charities in limited partnerships. The Service challenges these arrangements by arguing that the charitable purpose of the tax exempt
entity has been subrogated to the private interests of the "for-profit"
partners. 0 To determine whether an exempt organization furthers
its charitable purpose, the IRS seems to have adopted a "means/
ends" approach to determine whether the tax exempt organization
48. This example represents only one method of ensuring that syndicated housing remains available to low-income tenants. The analysis that follows does not address all of the
changes in the 1984 Act which might affect such a syndication, but rather is intended to make
readers generally aware of the opportunities and pitfalls associated with this type of project.
49. Other techniques operate to put the charitable organization in a position to control
the disposition of the project. For example, a nonprofit partner might negotiate in the partnership agreement an option or right of first refusal, at a fixed determinable price, on the sale of
the project or dissolution of the partnership. Also, the partnership agreement may establish a
sinking fund or special allocations to enhance the equity position of the nonprofit partner. In
addition, various forms of debt mechanisms might be utilized to enhance the nonprofit entity
control over the future disposition of the property. These various techniques can be effective,
but the tax issues arising therefrom are extremely complex and require the attention of specialists in the field. See Nolan, Smith & Power, .upra note 42.
50. Comment, supra note 34, at 1355. See also Priv. Letter Rul. 78-20057 and 7820058; Gen. Cousel's Mem. 36293.
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satisfies the restrictions of Internal Revenue Code section
501(c)(3). 1 The analysis focuses on whether: 1) the goal is charitable; 2) the means employed to reach the result are reasonably
designed to achieve the charitable result; and 3) the scope of the
charitable achievement is commensurate with the resources used.52
1. The Organizationaland Operational Tests
First, to meet the organizational test of I.R.C. section 501(c)(3),
the entity must be organized "exclusively for one or more of the purposes specified" in section 501(c)(3)." Thus, the partnership agreement and other articles of organization must not "empower the organization to engage, otherwise than as an insubstantial part of its
activities, in activities which in themselves are not in furtherance of
one or more exempt purposes. '"" The organizational test is one of
the easiest hurdles to clear in order to maintain exempt status.5 5
The second condition of section 501(c)(3) requires that an organization be "operated exclusively" for one or more exempt purposes; thus, such an organization must engage "primarily in activities which accomplish one or more of such exempt purposes." 6 The
operational test, in contrast to the organizational test, is more complex and particularly ill-suited for dealing with limited partnerships.
51. Purcell & Yanowitz, supra note 34. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (CCH-1984) exempts from
taxation the following:
Corporations, and any community chest, fund, or foundation, organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety,
literary, or educational purposes, or to foster national or international amateur
sports competition (but only if no part of its activities involve the provision of
athletic facilities or equipment), or for the prevention of cruelty to children or
animals, no part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private
shareholder or individual, no substantial part of the activities of which is carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to influence legislation, (except as
otherwise provided in subsection (h)), and which does not participate in, or intervene in (including the publishing or distributing of statement), any political
campaign on behalf of any candidate for public office.

Id.
52. Id. See also Rev. Rul. 64-182, 1964-1 C.B. 186. The discussion which follows is not
a complete analysis of the complex § 501(c)(3) requirements, but only a general description of
those restrictions which prevent parties other than the charitable class from receiving substantial benefits.
53. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-(a) (1960). Of those specified purposes, providing housing to the elderly, handicapped, low-income and, under certain circumstances, moderate-income families qualify as charitable purposes. Rev. Rul. 79-18, 1979-1 C.B. 194; Rev. Rul. 7919, 1979-1 C.B. 195; Rev. Rul. 70-585,1970-2 C.B. 115.
54. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(b)(1)(B) (1960).
55. B. HOPKINS, THE LAW OF TAX EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS 57 (3d ed. 1979).
56. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(1) (1960).
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Because activities in furtherance of their charitable objectives also
generate benefits for other parties, it is questionable whether the organization is being operated "exclusively" for an exempt purpose.
When the Service challenges such arrangements, the courts focus on
the organization's activities from which it will infer one or more purposes.5 7 If such activities reflect a nonexempt commercial purpose
which is more than an insubstantial part of its activities, then these
activities constitute a violation of the operational test. 58
2. Private Inurement and Conflict of Interest
Similar to and interrelated with the organizational and operational hurdles are the private inurement and conflict of interest objections. To further insure that those groups organized and operated
for charitable purposes effectuate that purpose and proffer a benefit
to the charitable class "commensurate in scope with its financial resources,"" the entity must provide that "no part of the net earnings
• . .inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual."'
This clause is primarily designed to prevent self dealing by insiders
of the charity, such as officers, directors and shareholders who have
some degree of control and who might divert the organization's resources away from its charitable goals."'
In the context of a limited partnership, the relationship between
the charitable nonprofit organization, acting as a general partner,
and the for-profit limited partners becomes more complex. Because a
general partner has a fiduciary obligation to protect and promote the
private investments of the limited partners," the Service has argued
57. See Comment, supra note 34, at 1364. See also Purcell & Yanowitz, Contingent
Compensation Arrangements That Lack Safeguards May Jeopardize Exemption, 59 J. TAX'N
208 (1983).
58. See Comment, supra note 34, at 1364. See Plumstead Theatre Soc'y v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 1324, 1331-3 (1980), affd, 675 F.2d 244 (9th Cir. 1982). The court looked
closely to the facts of the case to determine whether the activities were directed primarily to
commercial or charitable ends. See also Gen. Counsel's Mem. 36293, in which the majority of
the dwelling units were for moderate-income families; the organization was denied I.R.C. §
501(c)(3) status because it was not operated exclusively for charitable purposes.
59. Rev. Rul. 64-182, 1964-1 C.B. 186.
60. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (CCH-1984).
61. B. HOPKINS, supra note 55, at 211. See also I.R.S. Priv. Letter Rul. 84-37009. The
minority view would also prevent such benefits from inuring to non-insiders with some level of
control or influence over the organization. Kaplan, Real Estate OpportunitiesFor Tax Exempt
Organizations: Potentials And Pitfalls After Plumstead Theatre, 61 TAxES 291, 295-6
(1983).
62. Comment, Procedures And Remedies In Limited Partner's Suits For Breach Of
The General Partner'sFiduciary Duty, 90 HAV. L. REv. 763, 764 (1977). See also Comment, supra note 34, at 1368-70.
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that conflicts of interest can force the charity to engage in practices
that conflict with its public, charitable purpose and result in private

benefit." After Plumstead Theatre Society v. Commissioner," it is
clear that a tax exempt organization can be part of a for-profit partnership; however, the partnership agreement must be drafted so as to
modify or waive any fiduciary or other obligations between partners
which would compel the tax exempt partner to act contrary to its
charitable purpose.65 In Plumstead Theatre, the court examined the
arrangements between the partners and found that an arms-length
transaction existed when the limited partners had no control over
how the tax exempt general partner administered or managed its
affairs, and when the general partner had no obligation to return
any of the capital contributions from its own funds."
Thus, in order to insulate the tax exempt general partner from
conflicts of interest intrinsic to the limited partnership vehicle, certain safeguards must be provided in the partnership agreement to
ensure achievement of the exempt purpose of the organization. Facts
and circumstances which are considered in determining whether a
partnership arrangement sufficiently insulates a section 501(c)(3) organization, as general partner, from any conflict between its partnership obligations and its exempt goals include: 1) nominal capital contribution by the exempt organization; 6 7 2) limited contractual
liability for the exempt organization;" 8 3) reasonable return on capital for the limited partners;69 and 4) the right of first refusal for the
63. See Comment, supra note 34, at 1370.
64. 74 T.C. at 1324.
65. Comment, supra note 34, at 1369, 1370. See also I.R.S. Priv. Letter Rul. 83-42001.
Notwithstanding an established charitable purpose, however, conflicts with
charitable goals can nevertheless arise in a limited partnership situation because
certain obligations are imposed upon a general partner. These obligations include an assumption of all liabilities by the general partner and a basic profit
orientation in the interest of the limited partners. Thus, unless an exempt organization acting as general partner, can insulate itself from these obligations,
conflicts exist which will preclude exemption.
Id.
66. Plumstead Theatre, 74 T.C. at 1334.
67. I.R.S. Priv. Letter Rul. 83-38127, 83-44099; Gen. Counsel's Mem. 39005. Presumably the IRS is reasoning that when there is minimal capital appreciation, the organization's
conflict between its projected pecuniary return and its obligation to serve the charitable class is
minimized. Purcell & Yanowitz, supra note 34, at 212.
68. This may be easily provided by a non-recourse deed of trust. Presumably, the service wanted to insulate the exempt organization's resources from being applied to protect private investor's capital. I.R.S. Priv. Letter Rul. 83-38127; Gen. Counsel's Mem. 39005; Purcell
& Yanowitz, supra note 34, at 217.
69. This is aimed at insuring that the private benefit will be incidental in comparison to

the public purpose served. Average return on capital invested should range from about 6-8%.
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tax exempt partner. 0
3. Unrelated Income
A final restriction imposed by the Service on tax exempt general
partners in limited partnership arrangements concerns unrelated income. If a section 501(c)(3) organization receives income from any
trade or business regularly carried on by that organization, the conduct of which is not "substantially related" to the charitable purpose
of the organization, then such income is taxable unrelated business
income.7 ' This issue often arises when a tax exempt general partner
receives compensation for its administrative duties, and in the case of
low-income real estate syndications, when a tax exempt charity enters into management contracts to oversee the daily maintenance and
occupancy of the housing units."' When such compensation is "reasonable" and "contributes importantly" to the accomplishment of the
charitable group's exempt purpose, these partnership activities have
been found to be "substantially related."'78 Certain benefits will undoubtedly flow to an entity providing management services for a real
estate syndication, but under a rationale similar to section 501(c)
standards, such arrangements have been approved. 4
In sum, for a tax exempt charity to act as a general partner in a
I.R.S. Priv. Letter Rul. 83-38127; Gen. Counsel's Mem. 39005. Even if less or even no profits
are realized by constructing and operating low-income housing, the IRS will not apply I.R.C.
§ 183 to disallow the losses generated thereby. Even though the activity may not be entered
into for profit, losses will not be considered a "hobby loss." Rev. Rul. 1979-300 C.B. 112.
70. I.R.S. Priv. Letter Rul. 83-38127; Gen. Counsel's Mem. 39005. The right of first
refusal minimizes the pressure to sell the property and raise rents after government regulations
lapse. Unfortunately, however, the IRS has not specified or limited the price which the tax
exempt general partner must pay. If granted the right of first refusal, and if it is not tied to
some ceiling on potential investor's returns, windfalls will be gained at the charitable class'
expense, who, as tenants, are often evicted by raised rents. Purcell & Yanowitz, supra note 34,
at 218.
71. I.R.C. §§ 511, 512, and 513 (CCH-1984). See also I.R.S. Priv. Letter Rul. 8425129. For a more detailed analysis, see Kaplan, supra note 61, at 296. Otherwise, substantial
business activities, which were intended only to benefit private parties, could be carried on by a
group engaging in only minimal charitable activities, and the gain thereby realized would not
be taxed.
72. See, e.g., I.R.S. Priv. Letter Rul. 84-37009, and 83-42001 in which the IRS challenged such tax exempt organizations which entered into management contracts to provide
necessary services.
73. I.R.S. Priv. Letter Rul. 84-37009, 84-25129. Similar to the I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) restrictions limiting private inurement, the private benefit resulting from the compensation for
management services cannot outweigh the benefit to the charitable class.
74. I.R.S. Priv. Letter Rul. 84-37009. The "extent to which private benefit will be
acceptable will vary in each case depending upon the degree of public benefit derived." Id.
The public benefit must "outweigh" the private benefit. I.R.S. Priv. Letter Rul. 84-25129.
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limited partnership real estate syndication, the partnership agreement must be narrowly tailored and include sufficient safeguards to
demonstrate to the Service, if necessary, that the partnership will be
organized and operated to further charitable purposes. Furthermore,
the charity must be sufficiently insulated to prevent conflicts of interest which result in prohibited or private benefits inuring to parties
other than the charitable class and from unrelated income inuring to
the charity itself.
After the Plumstead Theatre case, the stage was set for a new
era of creative private sector involvement in low-cost public housing
through the medium of charitable organizations. If done properly,
the use of such a vehicle to finance subsidized housing may increase
the already scarce supply of decent, safe and sanitary low-income
housing while simultaneously sheltering individual income. In addition, such efforts may stem the tide of conversion of existing low-cost
rental property which further depletes the pool of low-cost shelter.7 5
Involvement of this sort by charities would be consistent with the
role of the private sector in the emerging new federalism;7 however,
perceived abuses in the transfer of tax benefits through tax exempt
nonprofit groups has led Congress to enact sweeping and more restrictive tax exempt entity leasing provisions in the 1984 Act.77
IV.

TAX EXEMPT ENTITY LEASING RESTRICTIONS

A. Perceived Abuses
Because of budget cutbacks in the late 1970s and early 1980s,
many tax exempt entities used "privatization" 8 to finance projects
that might otherwise have been cancelled or delayed. Privatization
has been described as "private sector (i.e., a taxable entity) ownership and/or operation of property that has traditionally been owned
and/or operated by the public sector (i.e., a tax exempt entity such
75. There is still a substantial cost to the federal government through loss of tax revenue. It is important to recognize, however, that the involvement of charities can help spread
those dollars further and contribute importantly to the achievement of social goals and policies.
For a discussion of the use of the tax system to promote housing, see Washburn, The Role of
Tax Syndications In Housing: A Policy Perspective, 5 URB. L. & POLICY 1 (1982).
76. See Building Partnerships, President's Task Force on Private Sector Initiatives, Dec.
8, 1982, at 23. This report suggested that "innovative revitalization efforts" be spurred by
clarification of the requirements for nonprofits to qualify for tax exempt status.
77. Section 31a of the Act amends I.R.C. § 168 by redesigning subsection (j) as subsection (k), and by adding new subsection (j) relating to property used by tax exempt entities. In
addition, important definitions are added in I.R.C. § 7701(e).
78. H. CON. RFP, No. 861, 98th Cong., 2nd Sess. 779, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 772.3.

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 26

as a municipality, county, state or charity)." 9 Because tax exempt
entities are generally precluded from the benefit of accelerated depreciation and ITC when depreciable property is owned or operated by
such entities, 80 privatization, which shifts the ownership and/or operation of the property from the public to private sector, makes
available tax benefits which otherwise would not exist. Through sophisticated leasing, partnerships, and other arrangements, the private
sector was able to utilize these additional tax incentives, and thereafter pass through the benefits back to the tax exempt entities.
For example, before the 1984 Act, a tax exempt entity would
enter into a service contract with a taxable entity whereby the taxable entity both provided and serviced a product for the beneficial use
of the tax exempt entity." Because the taxable entity retained ownership of the product, it could utilize the ACRS deduction and ITC
credit and subsequently pass through the tax benefit to the tax exempt entity in the form of reduced charges."' Similarly, if a taxable
entity leased property to a tax exempt entity, the tax benefits of ownership, other than ITC,8 8 would be passed through to the tax exempt
entity in the form of reduced charges.
The most prevalent and scrutinized of these pass-through transactions were the lease-purchase8 4 agreements and the sale-leaseback
arrangements85 with municipalities,8 6 state and federal government
79. "Privatization is a method of financing a tax exempt entity's (e.g., county, municipality, charity) capital project by taking advantage of tax incentives available only to the private sector." Warren, Leases and Service Contracts with Tax Exempt Entities After the DRA,
TAX ADVISER, April 1985, at 230.
80. By definition, a tax exempt organization generally pays no taxes from which a depreciation expense may be deducted or against which an ITC may be credited. In addition,
ITC was, and still is, disallowed for property used by a tax exempt entity. See I.R.C. §
48(a)(4) and (5). See also I.R.C. § 48(g).
81. In the case Xerox Corp. v. United States, 656 F.2d 659 (1981), machines used by a
branch of the federal government were entitled to investment credit status because they were
not leased but supplied as an integral part of a service arrangement. See infra notes 125-28
and accompanying text.
82. Warren, supra note 79, at 231.
83. See supra note 80.
84. Lease purchase agreements are essentially installment sales contracts providing for
the acquisition of property by a governmental entity. Under the contract, the governmental
entity makes periodic payments representing installments of the purchase price of the property
plus interest. At the end of the contract term, the government will own the property or will
acquire it for a nominal sum. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, TRENDS IN MUNICIPAL LEASING

176, 179 (1983) (report prepared for Subcommittee on Oversight of House Ways and Means
Comm.) [hereinafter cited as MUNICIPAL LEASING].

85. Sale leaseback agreements make it possible for local governments and other nontaxable entities to benefit from tax deductions normally available only to the private sector. Under
these agreements, a local government or a tax exempt institution sells real property to private
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entities.8 7 The growth and innovations in tax exempt entity leasing
made it possible to circumvent the budget process and to benefit nontaxable entities from tax deductions available only to the private sector."8 In order to prevent windfall benefits from falling upon undeserving tax exempt entities and to prevent large losses of revenue
incident to such "double dipping"8 9 and other "use" arrangements,
Congress promulgated the tax exempt entity leasing provisions."
B.

Legislative Response

The tax exempt entity leasing provisions directly attack those
sophisticated leasing, partnership and other arrangements which
provide benefits to non-taxable entities from private sector tax deductions. 1 The legislative enactments are broad, far-reaching and
almost certain to stem the flow of pass-through tax benefits to nontaxable entities; however, the legislation is too broad, and in places,
too imprecise. It is likely that these provisions will have a chilling
investors and simultaneously leases it back. The private entity puts equity into the property
and in return gets rental payments and the tax benefits of ownership, which include interest
deductions, depreciation deductions, and occasionally, investment tax credit. These tax benefits
are generous and can be passed on to the lessee in the form of lower rental payments. Sale
leasebacks works for all manner of facilities, from college campuses to city halls, and their use
was growing. Id. at 177.
86. See id. at 177-78. Such uses include: a $54 million lease financing for new parking
facilities in Anaheim, Cal. and a $34 million lease financing to fund a telephone system for
San Diego County, Cal. Id. at 180. Under such an arrangement, a private college arranged to
sell and lease back its 650 acre campus from a private investor. Id. at 184.
87. Treasury Fact Sheet, Tax Exempt Leasing, FED. TAX. REP. (CCH) 6161 (Feb.
9, 1984). Even the U.S. Navy used such practices to fund the construction of ships for the
Rapid Development Force. See JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 90TH CONG., 1ST SESS., TAX
ASPECTS OF FEDERAL LEASING ARRANGEMENTS (Joint Comm. Print 1983).
88. See MUNICIPAL LEASING, supra note 84, at 177. "Potentially, however, they may
be a vehicle both for off-budget revenue sharing with local governments and for providing
subsidies to nontaxable institutions." Id. at 185.
89. "Double dipping" occurs when more than one component of a transaction is exempt
from taxation. For example, when property financed by tax exempt bonds is leased to a tax
exempt entity, "double dipping" results in large losses of revenue to the federal treasury.
Pending Legislation, Tax Exempt Entity Leasing, 3 STAND. FED. TAX'N REP. 6161 (Feb. 9,
1984).
90. H.R. REP. No. 432, Part 1, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 64-65 (1984). The House committee cited additional reasons, beyond revenue loss, for eliminating such benefits including
accountability, waste and the need for controlled appropriations rather than open-ended tax
benefits. Of special concern was the fact that only a proportion of those funds, of which the
federal revenue was deprived, were passed through to the tax exempt entity, while private
investors enjoyed the remainder. Under such circumstances, direct appropriations are more cost
effective.
91. H. CON. REP. No. 861, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 779, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 772.
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effect on the participation of tax exempt charities in low-income construction and rehabilitation projects.
The relevant portions"2 of the Act restrict the deduction available for depreciation of eighteen-year real property'" and low-income
housing"4 to a straight line method over a recovery period of forty
years if such property is "tax exempt use property."' 5 The loss of
ACRS would result in drastically lower depreciation deductions for
the first years the property is owned, and an investor would be able
to shelter much less of his immediate personal income from federal
income taxes. 9' In addition, if property is determined to be "tax exempt use property," ITCs could also be disallowed. 9 7 To an investor
in a limited partnership, the potential loss of these tax benefits could
dissuade him from investing in any syndication which might involve
tax exempt use property.
As defined in the Code, tax exempt use property includes any
depreciable property that is leased to,' used by," or partially
owned10 0 by a taic exempt entity. 0 Property that is leased to a tax
92. This analysis of the Tax Exempt Entity Leasing provisions of the 1984 Act is narrowly limited to the subject matter of this comment; i.e., the role of tax exempt entities in the
syndication of long term low-income housing. For a more broad and encompassing treatment
of the 1984 Act on all real estate investments, see Sanders & Roady, How the New Tax Law
Changes the Operating Rules for Real Estate Investments, 62 J. TAX'N 22 (1985).
93. I.R.C.§ 168(c)(2)(D) "18 year real property is a class of recovery property; i.e.,
tangible property of a character subject to allowance for depreciation as provided in § 167".
I.R.C. §§ 168(a), (c)(1), (c)(2)(D), and I.R.C. § 1250(c).
94. Low-income housing, as used in this section, is defined in I.R.C. § 1250(a)(1)(B)
and includes: 1) property financed in part pursuant to I.R.C. § 221(d)(3) or I.R.C. § 236 of
the National Housing Act; 2) property held for occupancy by persons eligible under § 8 of the
United States Housing Act of 1937; 3) housing-allowed depreciation deductions for rehabilitation expenditures pursuant to I.R.C. § 167(k); and 4) property financed in part under Title V
of the Housing Act of 1949. I.R.C. § 168(d)(2)(F).
95. Whereas the ACRS 18-year property and low-income housing enjoyed the benefits
of 18-year and 15-year recovery periods respectively, when such property is "tax exempt use
property," the depreciation deductions are spread out over a recovery period of at least 40
years but not less than 125% of the lease term. In addition, the rate at which the depreciation
deductions are allowed is reduced from 175% or 200% of the declining balance method for 18year property and low-income housing respectively to a slower straight line method. See I.R.C.
§ 1680)(1),(2). See also I.R.C. § 168(b)(2) and (4). For definitions of the methods used to
determine the rate of allowed depreciation deductions, see I.R.C. § 167(b).
96. Income is sheltered, in part, by offsetting or reducing the total amount of taxable
income by allowable expenses and depreciation deductions. Accelerated depreciation allows
greater amounts of income to be sheltered immediately. The benefit to the taxpayer is not tax
forgiveness, but tax deferral. Given the time value of money, such tax deferral is of substantial
benefit to the taxpayer.
97. I.R.C. § 168(j)(8), (9).
98. I.R.C. §§ 168()(3)(A), 168(j)(8).
99. I.R.C. § 7701(e), 168()(3) and (6).
100. I.R.C. § 168()(9).
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exempt entity in a disqualified lease 10 2 and property that is leased to
a partnership with a tax exempt entity constitutes tax exempt use
property. 1" In addition, if property is used by a tax exempt entity
pursuant to a service contract, such use may be recharacterized as a
lease for a tax exempt entity and thereby qualify as tax exempt use
property.1 ' Because tax exempt entities rarely, if ever, would have
101. For the purposes of I.R.C. § 168, a tax exempt entity includes any governmental
entity, foreign persons or entities and other entities exempt from tax pursuant to I.R.C. §
501(c), (d). I.R.C. § 168(j)(4)(A).
102. A disqualified lease includes any lease to a tax exempt entity which contains any of
the following conditions or characteristics: 1) the tax exempt entity participates in financing
through the issuance of tax exempt obligations under I.R.C. § 103; 2) such lease contains a
fixed or determinable purchase price or sale option which involves the tax exempt entity or
related entity; 3) such lease has a lease term in excess of 20 years; or 4) such lease occurs after
a sale or other transfer of the property by, or lease of the property from, such entity or a
related entity which has already been using the property. I.R.C. § 168 (j)(3)(B)(ii). At least
35% of such property must be leased to a tax exempt entity in a disqualified lease to constitute
tax exempt use property. I.R.C. § 168(j)(3)(B)(iii). An organization "will be treated as having
participated in a bond financing pursuant to § 169(j)(3)(B)(ii)(I) if, prior to the issuance of
bonds, it commits to enter into a lease of all or part of the property after it has been acquired
by the taxpayer" H.R. REP. No. 432 Part 11,98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1145, reprinted in 1984
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 125. This provision will effectively eliminate "double
dipping."
103. I.R.C. § 168()(8)(A). The tax exempt entity's proportionate share will be treated
as leased to such partners and thereby constitute tax exempt use property. Id. The 35%
threshold applicable when propeity is leased directly to a tax exempt entity would also apply
here. Id. See also W. MCKEE, W. NELSON, & R. WHITMORE, Tax Reform Act of 1984:
Provisions Affecting the Taxation of Partnershipsand Partners,43 INST. ON FED. TAX'N §
28.0214], at 28-4 (1985). In addition, rules similar to those in I.R.C. § 168()(8)(A) will apply
to tiered partnerships and other pass through entities. I.R.C. § 1680)(8)(B).
104. I.R.C. § 7701(e)(1). As codified in § 7701(e)(1), a service contract may be
recharacterized as a lease if: 1) the service recipient (or lessee) is in physical possession of the
property, controls the property, or has a significant economic or possessory interest in the
property; and 2) the service provider (or lessor) does not bear any significant economic risk if
there is nonperformance under the contract or does not use the property concurrently to provide services to entities unrelated to the service recipient; and 3) the total contract price does
not substantially exceed the rental value of the property for the contract period. Id. Hence, a
contract will be treated as a lease if, taking all factors into consideration, it more nearly resembles a lease; the presence or absence of any single factor may not be dispositive in any given
case. H.R. REP. No. 432 Part II, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1154, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 828. For a more complete explanation of disqualified lease, see Warren,
supra note 79, at 236-38.
Physical possession by the service recipient is indicative of a lease, yet the mere fact that
such property is located on the premises of the service recipient is not dispositive. If it is
operated by the employees of the service recipient, then such property is viewed as being in the
possession of the recipient. H.R. REP. No., 432 Part II, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1153, reprinted
in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 827.
When a service recipient has a right to dictate the manner in which the property is operated, maintained or improved, such control is indicative of a lease. Id.
A significant economic or possessory interest, indicative of a lease, is established by facts
which show that the property's use is likely to be dedicated to the service recipient for a
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reasons to enter into these types of arrangements when syndicating
low-income housing, attention should be directed to the real headache of the 1984 Act, the partnership allocation provision in section
168(j)(9). 10"
Perhaps the most troublesome provisions of the 1984 Act affecting tax exempt charitable organizations in real estate syndications
are those provisions which treat property owned by a partnership as
tax exempt use property. Section 1680)(9) provides that when a tax
exempt entity receives a "non-qualified allocation" of partnership
items,"" an amount equal to the tax exempt entity's greatest proportional share of such property will be tax exempt use property.'" For
an allocation to be qualified, it must: 1) be consistent with such entity's being allocated the same distributive share of other partnership
items; 2) remain the same during the entire period that the entity is
substantial portion of the useful life of the property and the service recipient shares the risk
that the property will be damaged, decline in value or appreciate in value. Id.
The fact that the total contract price is principally based on the recovery of the cost of the
property, and does not reflect the additional cost of the service, is indicative of a lease. Id. at
828.
105. Because these types of leasing and service contract arrangements are generally not
utilized in real estate syndications, they will pose little if any problem. Furthermore, tax exempt organizations operating low-income housing are specifically excluded from the
recharacterization provisions of the service contract analysis. I.R.C. § 7701(e)(5). However,
the broad definition of "lease" in I.R.C. § 168(j)(6) and the limited scope of the exclusion in
I.R.C. § 7701(e)(5) raise uncertainties and problems which will be discussed infra notes 12223 and accompanying text.
106. In general, partnership items allocated between the individual partners include
items of income, gain, loss, deductions and credits. The character of those partnership items is
determined as if such item were incurred in the same manner as incurred by the partnership.
I.R.C. § 702. Because a partnership itself is not subject to income tax, the distributive share of
each partner, as determined by the partnership agreement, is separately liable for income tax.
I.R.C. §§ 701, 702, 704. The distributive share, however, will only be determined by the
partnership agreement when the various allocations of partnership items have substantial economic effects; i.e., if there is a reasonable possibility that the allocations will affect substantially the dollar amounts to be received by the partners, from the partnership, independent of
tax consequences. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(h)(iii) (CCH 1985). In general, the allocation of
partnership items may be structured to meet the requirements of I.R.C. § 704(b)(2) if: 1) the
ailocations are reflected as an increase or decrease in each respective partner's capital account,
2) liquidation proceeds are distributed in accordance with their capital accounts, and 3) individual partners remain obligated to restore to the partnership any deficit in their capital account. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2) (CCH 1985). Problems of inordinate complexity are raised
when the partnership invests in real property subject to nonrecourse liability, as the case would
be here; nevertheless, these problems are beyond the scope of this comment. Hereinafter this
comment will assume that the partnership allocations have substantial economic effect.
107. I.R.C. § 168(j)(9)(A) and (C). When property is used by the tax exempt entity in
an unrelated trade or business (see supra notes 71-74 and accompanying text) then pursuant
to I.R.C. § 168(j)(3)(D) such property will not be characterized as tax exempt use property.
Id. The 35% threshold applicable when property is leased, directly or indirectly, to a tax
exempt entity, does not apply to these partnership allocation provisions. See infra note 113.
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a partner in the partnership; and 3) have substantial economic effect
pursuant to 704(b)(2).' 08 The third element requiring substantial economic effect of the qualified allocation does not impose any additional burden or present any immediate problems for a tax exempt
entity in a limited partnership; 09 however, the first two restrictions
may have a very chilling effect on the participation of charitable organizations in real estate syndications.
C. Restrictive Effect on Tax Exempt Charitable Organizations
1. PartnershipProvisions
Real estate syndications and tax exempt partnerships are directly affected by the partnership provisions of the tax exempt entity
leasing provisions. In particular, section 168(j)(9), which characterizes property owned by a partnership as tax exempt use property,
will affect most syndications of low-income housing which include a
tax exempt entity as a partner. For example, consider the earlier
illustration of a typical low-income housing syndication, when E, the
tax exempt general partner, has a minimal one percent interest in
operating income and loss, but upon liquidation, a substantial (fifty
percent, for example) interest in the residual proceeds upon liquidation of the partnership asset, i.e., H, the low-income housing project.
Assume further that E will receive a special allocation whereby his
distributive share of partnership income and/or gain increases from
one percent to twenty percent during the course of the partnership. 1 ° Assuming that such allocations have substantial economic ef108. I.R.C. § 168(j)(9)(B). Allocations resulting from contributions of property pursuant to I.R.C. § 709(c) will not be taken into account. Id.
109. As discussed supra note 106, partnership allocations may be structured in this
partnership agreement to meet the requirements of I.R.C. § 704(b)(2) and for the purposes of
this comment, the allocations will be assumed to have substantial economic effect. Nevertheless,
it is important to point out that the new regulations, similar in most respects to the proposed
regulations, under I.R.C. § 704(b)(2) will significantly affect the structure of future real estate
syndications. See generally Charyk, An Overview of the Proposed Section 704 Partnership
Allocation Regulations-Implicationsfor Real Estate Partnerships, 1983 J. OF REAL ESTATE
TAX'N 34. See also Pehhell, Final PartnershipAllocation Regs. Will Have Significant Impact, 64 J. TAX'N 188 (1986).
110. Such a special allocation, commonly referred to as a "flip," will typically be structured to occur when the limited partners have been allocated an amount of partnership income
and gain equal to their original capital contribution. These allocations will, in effect, build up
the tax exempt limited partner's capital account so that substantial liquidation proceeds may
be allocated to him, despite minimal capital contributions at the outset, and such allocations
will have substantial economic effect within the meaning of I.R.C. § 704(b)(2). Again, transitory allocations must be carefully scrutinized in light of the new regulations under I.R.C. §
704(b)(2). See supra note 109.
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fect, 111 then with regard to the special allocation, at least twenty percent of the partnership property would be considered the tax exempt
use property."' 2 Clearly, E would be neither receiving the same distributive share of partnership items, nor would E's share remain the
same during the period of the partnership.11 8 Accordingly, twenty
percent of the partnership property would lose the benefits of
ACRS;' 14 thus, the investment incentives for potential limited partners is reduced.
In sum, it seems that all special and other inconsistent distributions of partnership items during the course of the partnership will
be considered nonqualified allocations. The question remains unresolved, however, whether a "rear-end" allocation of liquidation
proceeds will constitute nonqualified allocations. Again, referring
back to the model illustration in which E, the tax exempt limited
partner, was allocated a fifty percent interest in the liquidation proceeds, a broad interpretation, of the partnership provision would consider a fifty percent allocation to be nonqualified, and fifty percent of
the partnership property would be tax exempt use property. With a
fifty percent loss of ACRS on the partnership property, the limited
partners would be able to shelter much less of their personal incomes. Such a disincentive would severely diminish the attractiveness
of the investment and have a chilling effect on the participation of
charitable organizations in the low-income real estate investments of
the private sector. Alternatively, if the partnership agreement were
structured to eliminate this rear-end allocation to the tax exempt
limited partner, then the charitable organization's control over the
future disposition of the project would be severely reduced.
Many experts believed that the IRS would enact regulations to
give the tax exempt entity leasing provisions such a broad interpretation; 11 5 however, the temporary regulations the IRS issued July 2,
1985 seem to indicate that such inconsistent distribution of liquidation proceeds will not cause the allocation to be nonqualified.1 16 In
111.

See supra note 109.

112. I.R.C. § 168()(9)(A), (B), (C).
113. I.R.C. § 168(j)(9)(B)(i). Similarly, even if there were no flip so that throughout the
entire period of the partnership, E received 1% of the items of income, loss, deductions and
credit, but 20% of partnership gain, 20% of the property would still be considered tax exempt
use property. Id. See also W. McKEE, W. NELSON, & W. WHITMORE, supra note 103, §
28.0215] at 28-7; Treas. Reg. § 1.168, Q-A 22, example 2 (proposed July 2, 1985).
114. See I.R.C. § 168(0)(1).
115. See Sanders & Roady, supra note at 92, at 24; see also Power, supra note 47, at
13.
116. Treas. Reg. § 1.168, Q-A 22, example 1 (proposed July 2, 1985). A, a taxable
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sum, if the temporary regulations are adopted in their present form,
the basic structure of the limited partnership, which allows both the
private sector and charitable tax exempt entities to contribute to the
supply of long term low-income housing, will survive the axe of tax
reform. 1 7 Nevertheless, the structure of the limited partnership will
be directly affected by the tax exempt entity leasing provisions, and
the uncertainties generated therefrom will have a chilling effect on
the participation of tax exempt charitable organizations.
2.

Disqualified "Lease" Provisions

In contrast to the direct effect the partnership provisions will
have on the participation of tax exempt entities in real estate syndications, the "disqualified lease" provisions"' may only indirectly affect a real estate syndication with a tax exempt charitable organizaentity, and B, a tax-exempt entity, form a partnership in 1985. A contributes $800,000 to the
partnership; B contributes $200,000. The partnership agreement allocated 95% of each item of
income, gain, loss, deduction, credit, and basis to A; B's share of each of these items is 5%.
Liquidation proceeds are throughout the terms of the partnership to be distributed in accordance with the partner's capital account balances, and any partner with a deficit in his capital
account following the distribution of liquidation proceeds is required to restore the amount of
such deficit to the partnership. Assuming that these allocations have substantial economic effect
within the meaning of I.R.C. § 704(b)(2), they are qualified because B's distributive share of
each item of income, gain, loss, deduction, credit, and basis will remain the same during the
entire period that B is a partner. The fact that the liquidation proceeds may be distributed in a
ratio other than 95% to 5% does not cause the allocations not to be qualified.
Thus, if these temporary regulations are enacted in their present form, the rear-end allocations of liquidation proceeds would clearly be qualified providing they have substantial economic effect within the meaning of § 704(b)(2). See generally Yanowitz & Purcell, Analysis of
the Just-Issued Temporary Regulations on Tax Exempt Entity Leasing, 63 J. TAX'N 112
(1985).
117. Until final regulations are enacted, pursuant to § I.R.C. 168(j)(10), these arrangements will still remain somewhat uncertain. Even if the temporary regulations are enacted, it
is important to point out that these unique partnership arrangements will not escape the 1984
Act unscathed. For instance, the limitations imposed upon special or inconsistent allocations
might make it difficult to distribute liquidation proceeds in accordance with the tax exempt
partner's capital account, and without substantial economic effect such allocations would be
nonqualified. I.R.C. § 168(j)(9)(b)(ii). It may be possible to plan around these difficulties by
including in the limited partnership vehicle a taxable nonprofit subsidiary to act as a general
partner in the syndication; being taxable, the nonprofit subsidiary might be able to receive
unqualified allocations without the adverse consequences of tax exempt use property. See
Power, supra note 47, at 13. Nevertheless, there remain many uncertainties with this approach; the taxable subsidiary may be treated as a related entity (I.R.C. § 168(j)(7)) or other
entity (I.R.C. § 168(j)(9)(D)) and be subject to the same treatment as a tax exempt entity.
Furthermore, changes proposed by the Technical Correction Act of 1985 might consider such a
taxable subsidiary to be the successor organization of a tax exempt entity, and thereby subject
to the same treatment as the parent tax exempt entity. H.R. 1800, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131
CONG. RSe H1631
ux (1985).

118. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
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tion. As defined under section 168(j) of the Code, a disqualified lease
will lead to a determination of tax exempt use property when such
property is leased to a tax exempt entity or a partnership with a tax
exempt entity.' 19 Because a real estate syndication would rarely, if
20
ever, choose to lease depreciable property, 1 it seems unlikely that
these provisions would have an adverse impact on the participation
of charitable organizations. Nevertheless, if the Service finds that
there exists a lease to a tax exempt entity, it is likely that such a
and would result in a determination of
lease would be disqualified
12
tax exempt use property.
The problems and uncertainties associated with the disqualified
lease provisions can be attributed, in large part, to the broad definition given to the term "lease" which includes "any grant of a right to
use property."' 22 Although this broad definition is not explicit in section 168(j)(9) of the Code,' 8 other statutory provisions and examples in the legislative history demonstrate the expansive definition
given to this "lease" in the context of service contracts, management
contracts and other arrangements.

a. Service Contracts and Other Arrangements
As discussed above, service contracts have been used to transfer
the use and possession of property to tax exempt entities without
119. See I.R.C. § 168(j)(3) and (8) (CCH-1984).
120. When depreciable property is not owned by a partnership, individual or other entity, but rather leased to such entity, then that entity is not entitled to take depreciation deductions on the property so leased. This would obviate the primary motivation of most limited
partners in real estate syndications.
121. Three of the four tests outlined in note 102, any one of which would disqualify a
lease to a tax exempt entity, would likely be triggered as follows: 1) Because of the drastic
reduction in the amount of federal funds available for low-income housing, syndicators are
turning to state and municipal agencies which derive their funding, in large part, from tax
exempt bonds. See D. SMITH, supra note 24, at 5. Such tax exempt financing would disqualify
a "lease." I.R.C. § 168(j)(3)(B)(ii)(1)(2). If the tax exempt entity negotiated an option or right
of first refusal at a fixed or determinable price, as discussed supra note 102, then any such
"lease" would be disqualified, I.R.C. § 168(j)(3)(B)(ii)(II); 3) If such "lease" occurred after a
sale or other transfer by a tax exempt entity, similar to the original sale contemplated in the
illustration discussed at note 48 and accompanying text, then the "lease" would be disqualified. I.R.C. § 168(j)(3)(B)(ii)(Ill).
122. I.R.C. § 168(j)(6)(A). In its broadest sense, a partnership which allowed a charitable general partner to control and limit the use of the partnership property for low-income
housing might constitute a "grant of a right to use property", i.e., a lease. However fantastic as
this seems, the partnership provisions parallel this interpretation and find tax exempt use
property in those nonqualified allocations to tax exempt partners.
123. As discussed in note 122, the broad definition is implicit in the partnership provisions, especially as the partnership provisions arc applied to tiered partnerships and any other
pass through entities. I.R.O. § 168(j)(9)(D).
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sacrificing the transferor's investment tax credits. 1 2 4 Until the 1984
Act, the characterization of such arrangements as either a lease or
service contract was controlled by case law, revenue rulings and private letter rulings.12' The analysis emerging from those cases focused
on who enjoyed the benefits and who bore the burdens of ownership."' As codified in section 7701(e), 3 7 a contract will be treated as
a lease if, taking all factors into consideration, it more nearly resem1 28

bles a lease.
These restrictions on service contracts will not, for the most
part, affect tax exempt charities in real estate syndications because
these service contracts are generally not integral to their partnership
agreements. Nevertheless, other provisions of the Act require that
this same "benefits and burdens" analysis be applied to partnerships
and other pass-through entities to determine whether or not such
other arrangements are more properly treated as a lease." 9 For example, when a not-for-profit hospital and a partnership composed of
members of the hospital's medical staff entered into a joint venture to
acquire and operate a computer axial tomography (or "CAT") scanner, the arrangement was treated as conveying a leasehold estate between the parties.'3 Even though the arrangement was classified as
a partnership with qualified allocations and substantial economic effect between the partners, because the not-for-profit hospital receives
the majority of the benefits and burdens of ownership, the CAT
scanner becomes tax exempt use property.'' Thus, the essence of
the partnership, the common ownership interest in partnership property, has been recharacterized and recast into a leasehold interest for
tax purposes.
In this particular example, it is not too difficult to apply the
124. See supra text accompanying notes 81-88.
125. Xerox Corp. v. United States, 656 F.2d 659 (1981). H. CON. REP. No. 861, 98th
Cong., 2d Sess. 789, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 783.
126. The benefits of ownership are possession and control. Xerox Corp., 656 F.2d at
671-76. The burdens of ownership are suffering the risks of loss and responsibility for maintenance and repair of the property. Id. at 671-73. The legislative history of the bill makes clear
that service contract arrangements may be characterized as a lease when "property is used to
provide services to or for the benefit of a tax exempt entity." H.R. REP. No. 432 Part 11,98th
Cong., 2d Sess. 1153, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWs 828.
127. See supra note 104.
128. See H.R. REP. No. 432 Part II, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1154 (1984), reprinted in
1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 828.
129. See I.R.C. § 7701(e)(2) (CCH-1984).
130. See H.R. REP. No. 432 Part II, 98th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1160 (1984), reprinted in
1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 834-35.
131. Id.
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relevant factors of the service contract analysis; however, in the context of a real estate syndication with a tax exempt charity acting as
general partner, the application of the benefits and burdens analysis
is more complex.1"' For this and other reasons,13 3 Congress excluded
section 501(c)(3) and 501(c)(4) organizations who operate low-income residential property from the service contract and other arrangement rules.' 84 The legislative history of the Act makes it clear
that a charitable organization "is not subject to the service contract
or other arrangements of the bill;' 8 " therefore, the "leasing of units
of such property to occupants is not treated as use by or on behalf of
86
such an organization."'
Even though service contracts are rarely, if ever, entered into
between taxable and tax exempt entities syndicating real estate, the
exclusion will effectively eliminate any complex analyses which
might arise from the "other arrangement" provisions of the Act.' 7
Nevertheless, this exclusion for charitable organizations is very narrow and raises more uncertainties than it resolves.' 38
132. It is unclear who is providing and who is receiving what services. Certainly a tax
exempt general partner is providing administrative and managerial services; yet, at the same
time, the taxable limited partners are providing financing and other valuable services. Furthermore, while the tax exempt general partner may be receiving an indirect benefit by providing
affordable housing to low-income tenants, the limited partners are also receiving benefits from
their tax sheltered real estate investments. Thus, the exclusion from these restrictions in I.R.C.
§ 7701(e)(5) seems both logical and necessary.
133. The exception for 501(c)(3) organizations operating low-income housing, I.R.C. §
7701(e)(5), is very narrow. Interview with Michael G. Smith, Attorney with the National
Housing Law Project at Berkeley, Cal. (Oct. 15, 1984).
134. I.R.C. § 7701(e)(5) (CCH-1984). At least 80% of the units of such property must
be leased to low-income tenants as defined in I.R.C. § 167(k)(3)(B), and the tax exempt organization must be described in either I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) or (4).
135. H. CON. REP. No. 861, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 790, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 784. Even though the legislative history literally applies the exclusion to
"other arrangements of the bill," I.R.C. § 7701(e)(5) limits the exclusion to "this subsection,"
i.e., I.R.C. § 7701(e). Such use of language in the legislative history is not dispositive in determining the ambit of I.R.C. § 7701(e)(5), but rather it raises certain questions. In particular,
did Congress intend to exclude the same charitable organizations from the other arrangements
in the partnership provisions (I.R.C. § 168(j)(9)(D)), from the broad definition of "lease"
(I.R.C. § 168(j)(6)), or from the related entity or successor provisions (1.R.C. §
168(j)(4)(E)(iii) and § 168(j)(7))? Conversely, did Congress intend that the "leasing of such
units" to low-income tenants constitute a "grant of right to use" property per 1680)(6)?
136. H. CON. REP. No. 861, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 790, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 784.

137. See I.R.C. § 7701(e)(2).
138. See supra note 135. The temporary regulations issued July 2, 1985 further indicate that this exclusion will be narrowly interpreted. Treas. Reg. § 1.168-IT, T.D. 8033, 50
Fed. Reg. 27,228 (1985). For example:
Q-19. Does a contract to provide heating, maintenance, etc. services in lowincome housing come within the low-income housing exception in I.R.C. §
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Management Contracts

A final uncertain and potentially chilling effect on the participation of tax exempt entities in real estate syndications lies in the
broad application of the tax exempt leasing legislation to management contracts. Tax exempt organizations, which commonly contracted with private syndications to manage low-income housing developments,' 3 9 now must take special care to avoid such contracts
being treated as a lease. The legislative history of the bill leaves open
the possibility that even though a management contract might not be
treated as a lease under the service contract provisions, such a management contract may well be treated as a lease under "present law
rules."'O The legislative history points to two cases from which the
test factors under the present law rules have been derived."" The
legislative history also lists three factors which, if met, would
recharacterize a management contract as a lease. These are: 1)
whether the taxpayer does not adequately control the property; 2)
whether the taxpayer does not bear the risk of loss; and 3) whether
the tax exempt entity provides services to third parties for its "own
benefit."" 2
Of these three factors, only the first two are clearly derived
from the McNabb and Meagher cases.'14 The third factor seems to
7701(e)(5) to the service contract rules set forth in I.R.C. § 7701(e)?
A-19. No. Although certain low-income housing operated by or for an organization described in paragraphs (3) or (4) of I.R.C. § 503(c) is not subject to the
service contract rules in I.R.C. § 7701(d), a contract, for instance, to provide
heating services to low-income housing units, such as by installing and operating
a furnace, does not constitute "low-income housing" within the meaning of
I.R.C. § 7701(e)(5). Thus, the rules of I.R.C. § 7701(e) apply to such contracts
in determining whether they are properly treated as leases.
Id.
139. For instance, in the legislative history there is an example involving a real estate
syndication of low-income housing when the tax exempt entity, a municipal housing authority,
enters into a long term management contract. See H.R. REP. No. 432 Part II, 98th Cong., 2nd
Sess, 1155-56, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 136.
140. H.R. REP. No. 432 Part II, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1156-57, reprinted in 1984 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 830.

141. Id.; McNabb v. Commissioner, 81-1 USTC 86, 156 [47 AFTR 2d 81-513] (W.D.
Wash. 1980); Meagher v. Commissioner, 36 T.C.M. 1091 [1977 P-H T.C. Memo 77, 2701
(1977); see also Americo v. Commissioner, 82 T.C. 654 (1984). In the McNabb and Meagher
cases, the courts closely examined the contractual arrangements between the parties to determine whether they were indicative of a principal-agent or lessor-lessee relationship.
142. H.R. REP. No. 432 Part II, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1156-57, reprinted in 1984 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 136.

143. McNabb, 81-1 USTC at 86,156-57; Meagher, 36 T.C.M. at 1091-93; Americo, at
654, 674. These cases cited an additional factor pointing toward the existence of a management
contract which the legislative history overlooks; if the service provider uses his "best efforts" to
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introduce a new element into the present law rules for analyzing
management contracts which is similar to the service contract analysis. 1" In particular, the present law rules, as set out in Meagher and
McNabb, make no direct reference to personal "benefit" when distinguishing leases from management contracts. 4 In contrast, the serexamines the economic benefits and
vice contract analysis closely
'e
ownership?
of
burdens
What exactly is meant by "benefit" in this context is uncertain,
and whether the Internal Revenue Service will try to inject this new
element into the management contract analysis is equally uncertain.
What is certain is that the Service has already challenged many of

these management contracts, treating as unrelated income any compensation which results in more than an incidental benefit to the tax

exempt organization.' 47 It seems, therefore, that the new element injected into the management contract analysis is not only vague and
uncertain, but also redundant and possibly even unintended. Nonetheless, special care must be taken to comply with the present law
rules and to avoid the disqualified lease provisions of the 1984 Act.

In conclusion, the tax exempt entity leasing provisions of the
arrange for the leasing of the property, then a management contract, not a lease, exists. Id.
Presumably, the use of one's best efforts to lease is indicative of an agency relationship, but it
is uncertain how this factor is to be included in any analysis of a tax exempt charity's relation
to the other partners in a real estate syndication. In an example in the legislative history, the
municipal agency contracted to use its best efforts to lease the low-income housing units, yet
the limited analysis in the example made no relevant conclusions or dispositions regarding that
fact. See supra note 139. Nevertheless, as the example demonstrates, this requirement can be
easily met with a provision in the partnership agreement or management contract.
144. A new element is being injected into the present law rules, despite statements in
the legislative history that the bill does not "affect present law rules for determining the treatment of management contracts." H. R. REP. No. 432 Part II, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1153,
reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 827.
145. The introduction of this personal "benefit" element reshapes the present law rules
into an analysis more similar to the benefits and burdens analysis of the service contract provisions. The questions, then, which must be addressed are: 1) what is meant by "benefit" in this
context; and 2) for whose benefit does a tax exempt charity provide management services? In
the McNabb case, the service provider was "free to use the service recipient's property as he
saw fit." McNabb, 81-1 USTC at 86,158. Of course, a tax exempt charity acting as a general
partner of a real estate syndication is not "free to use" such property in any manner because a
general partner is bound by both the partnership agreement and fiduciary duties to the limited
partners. See supra note 62 and accompanying text. In the CAT scanner example, in which
the machine was being "used" for the patients of the not-for-profit hospital, the arrangement
was considered a lease because the scanner was being "used for the benefit" of the hospital. By
this interpretation of benefit, a tax exempt general partner providing services for low-income
tenants might be providing services for its own benefit.
146. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
147. I.R.S. Priv. Letter Rul. 84-37009, 83-42001. See also supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
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1984 Act will both directly and indirectly affect the participation of
tax exempt entities in real estate syndications. The partnership provisions of the Act will directly affect the structure of the partnership
distributions and allocations. The disqualified lease provisions will
indirectly affect such tax exempt entities by requiring additional
planning and caution to structure low income real estate syndications. The exclusion for low-income housing, operated by or for
charitable organizations, will eliminate some of the problems, yet the
uncertainties raised by the broad definition of "lease" and the new
management contract analysis further complicate the planning process. These uncertainties and complexities are likely to have a chilling effect upon the participation of tax exempt charities in real estate syndications.
V.

PROPOSED SOLUTIONS

Although the Act will adversely affect, in varying degrees, almost every community development project that relies on federal income tax incentives, only in rare cases will whole projects become
unfeasible." 4 Instead, private investors will be able to circumscribe
those new provisions which are clear and comprehensible through
careful drafting and organization; however, those more ambiguous
and complex provisions will force investors and syndicators to
"squeeze out" tax exempt organizations from their syndications for
fear of losing tax incentives. Until these complicated and uncertain
provisions are addressed by final regulations, new legislation, or case
law, the goal of maintaining an adequate supply of low-income
housing will remain unrealized.
To resolve these legislative shortcomings, it is important to keep
in mind the intent of the legislation-to prevent the pass-through of
tax incentives from taxable to non-taxable entities.' 41 Municipal
leasing practices, for example, allowed a municipality to enjoy both
the benefits of ownership through a sale leaseback transaction and
also the pass-through tax benefits of ACRS and tax exempt bond
financing. 5 In contrast, the tax exempt entity in the model illustra148. As discussed supra note 117 and accompanying text, certain planning strategies
may successfully protect a project from the tax exempt entity leasing provisions; however, there
are many hidden pitfalls and traps. The temporary regulations have indicated that the Service
will issue letter rulings on "qualified allocations" but not on whether the allocation has substantial economic effect. Treas. Reg. § 1.168-IT, (Q-A 24), T.D. 8033, 50 Fed. Reg. 27,228
(1985).
149. See supra notes 84-90 and accompanying text.
150. Id.
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tion of a low-income syndication1" 1 cannot directly enjoy the benefits
of ownership. The restrictions and limitations of section 501(c)(3)
require that the private benefit accruing to the tax exempt entity be
incidental compared to the public benefit.1"' Furthermore, the fiduciary duty owed by the tax exempt general partner to the taxable limited partners further restricts the tax exempt entity's use and enjoyment of the property." It is true that the tax exempt charity is able
to utilize certain pass-through tax benefits to promote its charitable
end, but many of these tax incentives have already been sanctioned
and accepted by the Congress.15 4 Furthermore, any prohibited tax
benefit which might be realized by a tax exempt entity is directly
passed back through to the charitable class, i.e., those people qualified to rent low-income housing.
To further demonstrate the unsoundness of the present statutory
scheme, it is important to compare the benefits to the public and the
burdens on the federal treasury in real estate syndications which do
and do not include tax exempt entities. Before the 1984 Act, both
types of syndications were able to take advantage of ACRS and other
tax incentives during the period of the partnership. After termination
of the partnership, however, a charitable general partner could control the future disposition of the property and preserve its use for the
benefit of low-income tenants.155 In contrast, a syndication without a
charitable general partner would be free to resyndicate and convert
the property to a more profitable use after the HUD restrictions and
tax incentives lapsed. 5 6 Given the incidental amount of income a
section 501(c)(3) organization is permitted to accrue, the minimal
loss of tax revenue to the government, and the tremendous need for
long term low-income housing, a broad exclusion for charitable organizations providing low-income housing is soundly justified.
In order to exclude tax exempt charitable organizations from
the restrictive provisions of the tax exempt entity leasing rules, an
exclusion similar to that in section 7701(e)(5) should be included
directly in subsection 168(j) of the Code. 57 Like the other exclusions
151. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
152. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
153. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
154. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 167(k); § 168(b)(4); §48(g)(2)(D).
155. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
156. See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
157. Such an exclusion might read: "This subsection shall not apply to any low-income
housing (within the meaning of I.R.C. § 168(c)(2)(F)) if: 1) such property is operated by or
for an organization described in paragraph (3) or (4) of § I.R.C. 501(c), and 2) at least 80% of
the units in such property are leased to low-income tenants (within the meaning of I.R.C. §
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491

in subsection 168(),'58 such charitable organizations would escape
both the restrictive partnership provisions and the broad "lease" disqualifications."6 9 This would further insulate a charitable organization from the indirect consequences of both the service contract' 60
and management contract analyses.' 6 ' In effect, this type of broad
exclusion would allow tax exempt charities to participate in lowincome real estate syndications as before the tax exempt entity leas1 62
ing provisions of the 1984 Act.

If the intent of Congress was to limit the participation of tax
exempt charities in providing low-income housing, then legislative
steps must be taken to clarify how, and at what cost, tax exempt
organizations might participate in real estate syndications to assist
them in achieving their tax exempt goals. In particular, the uncertainties raised by the broad definition of lease must be addressed by
statute or regulation. For example, a specific exclusion under paragraph 8 of subsection 168(j) might be enacted to limit the uncertain
reach of the term "lease." 16 This exclusion might completely exclude a charitable organization from the disqualified lease provisions,""' or it may simply limit the definition of "lease" for charita167(k)(3)(B))."
158. I.R.C. § 168(j)(5).
159. This would also eliminate the potential problems associated with "related entities"
and "successors" under the proposed Technical Corrections Act. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
160. Even though I.R.C. § 7701(e)(5) already excludes charitable organizations operating low-income housing the exclusion from the service contract analysis is narrow on its face
and in the interpretation adopted by the Temporary Regulations. See supra note 138. Thus, if
such a service contract or other arrangement, entered into by the charitable organization, is
determined to be a "lease," then such "lease" would not automatically lead to a finding of tax
exempt use property under I.R.C. § 1680). Perhaps loss of ITC is a sufficient cost for such
arrangements.
161. For example, if a management contract, entered into between a taxable syndication
and a nontaxable housing authority, were determined to be a lease under present law rules, it
would not necessarily lead to a finding of tax exempt use property under I.R.C. § 168(j).
Again, ITC would still be lost if applicable.
162. Notwithstanding the tax exempt entity leasing provisions, the structure of all real
estate investment partnerships must by analyzed in light of the new regulations issued under
I.R.C. § 704(b)(2). See supra note 106. For this reason, the I.R.S. will not issue ruling on
I.R.C. § 704(b)(2). See supra note 148.
163. Such a limited exclusion would leave the tax exempt entity subject to the partnership provisions and the uncertainties raised by the Technical Corrections Act of 1985. See
supra note 117 and accompanying text. Under such circumstances, additional regulations must
be issued to define what is a "substantially similar activity" under I.R.C. § 168(j)(4)(E)(iii);
this would permit use of some planning devices. See supra note 117.
164. This exclusion might read: "Paragraph 6 of this subsection shall not apply to any
low-income housing (within the meaning of I.R.C. I 1681(c)(2)(F)) if 1) such property is operated by or for an organization described in paragraph (3) or (4) of I.R.C. 501(c), and 2) at
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ble organizations." 6 Such an amendment to section 168(j) would
resolve many of the ambiguities and uncertainties of the tax exempt
entity leasing provisions; moreover, it would eliminate some of the
disincentives created by the 1984 Act which otherwise would squeeze
out tax exempt charities from low-income real estate syndications."'
VI.

CONCLUSION

To put into perspective the problems and solutions of both providing low-cost shelter and promoting the participation of charities
into low-income housing projects, it is important to remember that
the participation of charities has provided only a fraction of the
number of housing units that the private sector has independently
made available. Even though the participation of charities in real
estate syndications has only recently become possible, the need for
their participation has never been greater. Future tax legislation
should, therefore, address this unique and emerging opportunity to
provide long term low-cost shelter, and amendments to the present
legislation should be promulgated to provide additional incentives for
the participation of such charities.
The possibilities and opportunities are many, but unfortunately
beyond the scope of this comment.1 67 For the present, it is important
least 80% of the units in such property are leased to low-income tenants (within the meaning
of I.R.C. § 167(K)(3)(B))."
165. The scope of the term "lease" might be limited as under § 7701(e)(5). See supra
notes 134-35 and accompanying text. For example, an amendment or regulation to I.R.C. §
168(j)(6) might read: "The leasing of units of low-income residential property (within the
meaning of I.R.C. § 168(c)(2)(F)), operated by or for an organization described in paragraph
(3) or (4) of I.R.C. § 501(c), is not treated as use by or on behalf of such an organization."
(Compare the language of the legislative history. See supra note 135). This would limit the
broad definition of lease and eliminate uncertainties arising from I.R.C. § 168(j)(6).
166. Some of the disincentives and uncertainties created by the 1984 Act may be alleviated by tax reform plans proposed by the House of Representatives. In particular, the new
Incentive Depreciation System, replacing the ACRS method, (I.R.C. § 168), provides an election for entities controlled by tax exempt parties to escape characterization of partnership
property as tax exempt property. In exchange, gain recognized on the disposition of a tax
exempt entity's interest would be treated as unrelated business taxable income per I.R.C. §
511. H.R. 3838, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 201, 175 CONG. REC. 12,589 (1985). See also supra
notes 71-77 and accompanying text. Such an election would effect the partnership in a similar
fashion as the use of a taxable subsidiary in the partnership structure. See supra note 117.
However, if the entire proposal was approved by the Senate and President in its present form,
all real estate syndications would be drastically affected by the elimination of the "at risk"
exception (I.R.C. § 465(c)(2)(D)) for a real property. H.R. 3838, 99th Cong., istSess. § 401
(1985).
167. Future legislation could offer additional incentives for those arrangements providing long-term low-cost housing. Such amendments need not deplete or reduce any revenue
collection; rather, coordinated restrictions might increase revenue collection. If, for example,
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that a series of carefully-written and well-coordinated amendments
to the present legislation eliminate the disincentives created by the
1984 Act so that charitable organizations might participate in lowincome real estate syndications. The participation of such charities as
general partner in these community development projects, creates opportunities to provide additional low cost shelter into an already depleted marketplace. Further, such participation ensures the continued existence of those units for low-income tenants. The need for
such changes has never been greater. "The reality is that we have
come to the end of a fifty-year cycle of institutional building. It is not
enough to bemoan the past-we must structure the future."" 8 Because financial conservatism and federalism are no longer ideas for
the future, but rather the reality of the 1980s, involvement of the
private sector and charitable organizations in social programs
presents a great hope for the future. Whether safe, decent and affordable housing will trickle down to or dry up for those less fortunate Americans will depend on how we structure that future.
Daryl S. Alterwitz

the recovery or recapture period were extended for those projects not including a tax exempt
charity, then such an incentive would increase the participation of charities. The same restrictions might instead be made contingent to the resale of the units to eligible tenants at a fixed
price (pursuant to I.R.C. § 167(k)) or resale of the limited partnership interests to the tax
exempt general partner who would continue to supply low-income tenants with decent and
affordable shelter.
It is interesting to note that the tax reform bill passed on Dec. 17, 1985 by the House of
Representatives includes such a restrictive provision which would increase the incentive to
invest in low-income housing. In particular, very low-income housing projects would be allowed a recovery period of 20 years, eight years less than the proposed recovery period for
other forms of real property. See generally H.R. 3838, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 201, 175 CONG.
REC. 12,589 (1985).
168. Hughes & Sternlieb, Structuring the Future, Soc'v, March/April 1984, at 28, 34.

